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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
CARL JOHANSON AND CLARA J. 
JOHANSON, His Wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable M. J. Bronson, Judge 
Appellants' Brief on Respondent's 
Petition for Rehearing 
Respondent has filed a brief consisting'of 9·2 printed 
pages in support of its petition for rehearing in this 
cause. We shall not attempt to discuss all of the 
matters referred to in that brief . 
• T ustice Pratt has placed the right of the plaintiffs 
to maintain this action upon the ground that the 
statute secures a right in the insurance carrier to 
recover a fixed amount of money, that is to say, the 
amount of monry which the carrier has paid by way 
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of compensation, and that such right comes into ex.. 
istence as a property right when the compensation 
is paid; that this right, has its birth in property, 
money or expenditure, and that the cause of action 
whirh originally arose in tort hecomes s.ecurity 
available to the insuranre carrier for the satisfacJ 
tion of its right arising under the statute. This 
language is used by .Justice Pratt in the conr~e 'lf 
the opinion : 
'' Th£:1' carrier's interests are measured by 
the amount paid and not by the personal 
relationship bPtween the parents and son, 
which. jn the cause of artion for death, 
governs the amount of dainages recovered. 
The latter merely goes to the question of 
the f:l'Xtent to which the carrier's interests 
may ultimately be satisfied." 
The conclusion is reached hv .Jus tire Pratt that thn 
cause of action under Section 42-1-58, in favor of 
the insurance carrier, may he as,signed. vVe under-
stand the opinion of Ju~ticc> Pratt to hold that the 
amount of the plaintiffs' recovery is to be limited 
to the total amount of compensation paid by the 
carrier to the plaintiffs. 
Justice Wolfe concurs in the result reached by Jus-
tice Pratt. Justice Wolfe holds that the statute 
effect~ an assignment of the cauge of action to the 
Insurance carrier paying the con1pensation. That 
the statute in effect make·s the cause of action 
assignable, and being assignable, the caus·e· of action 
may be reassigned by the insurance carrier to the 
plaintiffs .. , It is undoubtedly true, as stated by 
.Justice Wolfe, that there· is nothing whie;h prevents 
the legislature from making assignable a cause of 
action which was not assignable at common law and 
which at common law did not survive. It, there· 
1  
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l} 
fore, beco·mes a question of the construction to be 
given our ·statute in "'hich task we are not aided 
materially by old rules at common law. We are not 
certain whether the Justices concurring in the pre .. 
vailing opinion are agreed, however, that the plain-
tiffs must await the final payment of the full award 
before this action can be n1aintained. If the statute 
makes the cause of action assignable, whether it be 
an action! upon a property right or an action aris-
i~g in tort for wrongful death, there would be no 
~imitations except the general statute as to the time 
when the action could be brought, unless by the 
language of the statute, such limitation is imposed. 
On the latter point, Justice Larson, in a dissenting 
opinion, states that the employer or the carrier 
need not wait until all of the payments are made be-
fore he or it commences action against the third 
party. That might take years, when witnesses 
would be unavailable, and perhaps limitation would 
l1ave run. The- action may be brought any time when 
. compensation has been awarded and paild. The 
theory of Justice Larson is that the right to sue the 
wrong-doing third party for n~gligenee has been, 
by statute, vested solely in the one who pays com-
pensation, and that the cause of action of the carriei 
is one which enables it to recoup its losses oaused 
by the negligent acts of the tort-fea"or. That the 
maximum recovery by the carrier is the amount of 
the compensation award n1ade by the commission 
and which it is liable to pay; that the cause of action 
is not assignable . 
.T u~tice McDonoug1h holds that the right of recovery 
by the insurance carrier iR measured by the mon:-
etary value of the decedent's life to the dependents .. 
That this right was transferred bv operation ·of 
1aw to the insnrance carrier upon the dependents' 
r1ection to take compensation and the payment 
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thereof. That the whole_of this_ ~ght and not part 
of. it became th~ p:rope.rty of the insurance. carrier. 
In other words, that the insurance carrier .or. em-
ployer upon payment of .compensation would be-
come vested with the right to recover ·the full 
pecuniary value of the deceased's lif.e as measured 
iby the extent of contributions made by the deceased 
to his dependents and other factors which are taken 
into consideration as a matter of law in determin-
ing the value of a human life to those dama@ed. by 
his death. Justice McDonough states that the stat-
ute recognizes this full recovery by the insurance 
carrier because the statute requires the excess over 
compensation payments to be paid to the depend-
ents and that if the limit of the damages to be re-
covered were the amount of compensation paid 
there could be no excess. Justice 1\fcDonough 
further makes this pertinent observation in his con .. 
struction of the statute: 
''We must assume that the legislature in 
providing for disposition o.f any excess 
supposed that an amount in excess of the 
compensation paid could under proper in-
structions upon the measure o.f dan1ages be 
awarded. The damages, it seems clear, 
which the plaintiff, subrogated to the rights 
of the depende~ts, is entitled to recover, 
are to he measured by the pernnifl,ry loss 
caused the dependents hy the death of the 
deeedent; that such i~ the measure of dam-
r.g'es under our death statute." 
Again Justice ~1cDonough says: 
''Clearly the cause of action sued on by the 
insurance carrier is that which vested in 
the dependents and the allegation showing 





I I " 
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rog-ated to the right to recover thereon 
merely shows that he is the· proper party 
plaintiff.'' 
We see in the decision of Justice l\1cDonough the 
same expression of opinion expressed by J us.tice 
\Volfe until we come to the question of the assignJ 
ability of the cause of action by the insurance 
earrier back to the dependents. Justice \Volfe, as 
heretofore pointed out, takes the view, in which 
naturally the appellant agrees, that the s.tatute, by 
operation of law, effects an assignment of the 
cause of action from the dependents to the insurJ 
ance carrier which paid the compensation and the 
cause of action thus having been made assignable 
hy s1tatute it may be reas~igned by the insurance 
carrier to the dependents. We feel sure that all of 
the members of the Court will agree that there is 
nothing, as Justice Wolfe points out, which preJ 
vents the legislature from making assignable an 
action which at common law was not assignable and 
which did not surviy·e 
Jn~tic>e McDonough, ho,vever~ come~ to the eoncJuJ 
sion that the cause of action does not' survive and is 
therefore not assignable. This conclusion rest~ 
upon the decil"!ion in 
National Union Fire Insurance Company 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Conl-
pany, 44 Utah 26; 137 Pac. 653, 
plus the further consideration that the ri~ht of 
action under Section 42-1-58 is given to dependents 
~.nd not the heirs or personal representatives as 
provided in Section 104-3-11, and the fact tha:t the 
earlier compensation statute provided that as a con-
dition to reeeiving compensation·· the employee or 
oependents Rh011ld assign any· cause of arfion ex-
isting agtainst the wrong doer to the· one liahle for 
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the payment of compensation, and for this purpose 
made the caus.e of action assignable ; that because 
the legislature amended this section and provided 
for subrogati_on, there arises some evidence of a 
legislative intent to restrict the right of assign~ 
ment. 
The case cited by Justice l\1cDonough, National 
Union Fire Insurance Company v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Railroad Company, supra, is authority that 
the test of assignability is survival of the cause of 
action; such is the law announced in that case. When 
this cas.e wa.s decided, in 1913, we did not then have 
a compensation law and the Court had no occasion 
to conside~r a statute of the kind in question, by 
which rights were recognized of the character set 
forth in Section 42-1-58, and had no o:ccasion to con-
sider the history of legislation which brought about 
the enactment of compensation statutes., and par-
ticularly the rights of an employee or his depend-
ents where injury or death had resulted in the 
course of employment gro,,ring out of the wrongful 
acts or negligence of a third 11erson. 
Certainly the~ law has undergone important and 
material changes by way of leglislation relating to 
tlw fnregoing situation. 
First, the legislature made the payment of 
compensation the exclusive remedy; 
Th0n, the law was amended so as to pro-
vide a remedy a.Q'ainst a wrong-doer cauH-
inQ' injury to or death of a person engaged 
in his eipployment, and made the cam;e of 
8ction assignable. 
The purpose of the legislature was clear, at least 
to the extent, that the wrong-doer should not escape 
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ed with a rather clear l~gislative intent, to make it 
possible for the employer or insurance carrier in 
the above situations to recover fr01n the wrong-doer 
the amount paid as compensation, and the de-
pendents, who had suffered a pecuniary loss far in 
excess of the amount of compensation, to recover 
such excess loss. To accomplish this purpose the 
legislature said that the insurance carrier having 
paid the compensation should be subrogated to the 
rights of ~uch employee or his dependents to re-
cover against such third person and that if a re-
covery should be made in excess of the amount of 
the compensation awarded and paid then such ex-
cess, less the reasonable expense of the action, 
should be paid to the employee or his dependents. 
We do not thlnk the National Union Fire Insur-
ance Company case, supra, should be regarded as 
an authority to deny the dependents the benefits 
evidently intended for their advantage by the fore-
going statute. Justice ~IcDonoug:h recognizes such 
intent when he says that it must be assumed that 
the legislature in prnviding for disposition of any 
excess supposed that an amount in excess of the 
compensation paid could he awarded. Nor do we 
think that because the legislature repealed the for-
mer statute providing for assignment to the insur-
ance carrier and making the rause of ~tetion assign-
·~ hle evidences anv legislative intent that the ben-
efits for negligent injury or wrongful ~eath should 
no longer he ::~vajb ble to the dependents. On the 
contrary, the statute still carried out the whole-
some provision that sue h 'henefi ts were to be made 
available to surviving dependents. Very logically, 
and to meet the substantial equities, the l~gislature 
hy a studied effort, has attempted from time to 
time to make these benefits available for those who 
were made to suffer by injury or death . due to 
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thoroughly convinced that any construction which 
would permit these benefits to he taken from the 
dependents is, in view of our legislative history 
upon this question, foreign to the clear and man-
ifest purposes of the enactment of such legislation. 
Any matters of uncertainty can be clarified by a 
further opinion of the Court without the granting 
of a petition for rehearing. The law as announced 
jn the majority opinion permits the cause of action 
to be assigned. If the decision stands as noiW writ-
ten the plaintiffs and the court below should know 
whether the full amount of compensation must be 
paid before the [!,Ction can be maintained, and 
whether or not in the meantime, the cause of action 
is to become barred. Otherwise the court and a 
5ury will consume valuable time and incur addi-
tional expense in· a determination of thi~ queRtion. 
It is difficult for the writers to accept a construc-
tion of the statute which holds its meaning and 
purport to be that the injured employee, or in the 
event of his death, his dependents, are to he limited 
in any recovery to the amount of compensation 
awarded. In a suit by the in~ura.nee carrier it 
would, of course, he a pure gratuit~T to permit a re-
covery of a greater amount than it has prud as 
compensation, plus the expense inrident to a re-
covery of that amount. But certainly, it would not 
h8 a gor~.tnHv to n0rmit fiT' employee f'r hiR dPnendJ 
ents. to. recover the f11l} measure of nem1niarv loss, 
which they have s.ustained. There is much differ-
ence between. an accident or death arising in in-
dustry and heca.nse of the emplovment. and an 
accident or death resulting by the wrongful or 
ne·gligent act of a third person, and try as we will, 
we- cannot eom'prehend a ~onstruction which de-
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nies this added right for wrongful death or injury 
for the benefit of persons made to suffer thereby. 
When the legislature passed this sta~tute and said 
that if compensation is awarded, the insurance 
carrier should be subrogated to the rig·hts of such 
employee or his dependents, and then carefully 
provid€d that -if suclz recovery shalt be in excess of 
the amount of the co·mpensation award, the excess, 
iess the reasonable expense of the action should be 
paid to the employee or his dependents, there was 
something that the legislature had in rnind to pro-
vide as additional benefits by way of pecuniary loss 
to those who had suffered the misfortune of such 
injury or death. To such employee or dependents, 
it is not a mere gratuity to provide for such 
pecuniary loss. 
There is a clear distinction between accidents aris-
ing in industry and necessarily incident thereto and 
injury or death to one engaged in that industry 
brought about by the wrongful act. or negligence of 
a third person. Why would the legislature pass a 
statute, which in cases of wrongful death or negli-
gent injury, by its very terms, grant an additional 
benefit to dependents unle~~ the legislature intend- . 
ed that those persons should. be able to realize the 
henefits of such statute. It would be a useless 
thin()' t.o provide a benefit and g·hTe no re~m.edy by 
which it might be enjoyed. It affords little help to 
rPview rommon law action~ and e-nmmon law· plead-
ings, to interpret this sta.tut·e. We ought to look 
at the intent of the leg-islature in passing- it. Un-
doubtedly it was to relieve against the o~d statute 
which made assignment necessary before recovery 
of compensation 'vith no attendant benefits to 
those who suffer the loss. 
Thr sta.tnte had as well been left as it was, if no 
Roded benefit was to he given to those suffe'ring 
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the damage. The legislature would readily recog-
illize the inequity of a rule which resulted in injury 
to one and benefit to another, who had not suffered 
injury. The equitable thing was done by this stat-
ute first, to restore to the emplo~er or insurance 
carrier what it may have paid by way of compen-
sation, and second, to secure additional benefits to 
the injured employee or his dependents, and there-
by to provide a full meas.ure of pecuniary loss. 
'rhis removed and was intended to remove the com-
mon law restraint, as pointed out by Justice Wolfe, 
on assignability of tort actions and effected a stat-
utory as.stgnment of the cause of action ex delicito 
from the dependents to the company which paid 
the compensation, and thus the cause of action hav-
ing been made assignable by statute, could legally 
be re-assigned by the insurance carrier. 
Res.pondent in its brief on petition for rehearing, 
at page 27, sets forth its views why general assign-
ability under the statute should not be permitted. 
It admits that compensation acts are primarily for 
the protection of those who labor and their dep~nrl­
ents. It makes this statement and admission as 
the foundation of its further argument. However. 
it is further contended that neither the legislature 
or a court qy judicial construction should ever 
adopt any system that will encourage traffic . in 
rigJhts prot~cted by the comnensation ac:t. It is said 
that if the door is opened to a"~ii!Ilahilitv then 
compensation benefits may be used for the nur-
poses of speculation in the outcome of personal in-
jury suits ; that the doors should not. be openPd to 
such an extent as to create opportunities for fraud 
or lPqalized chicanery. 
This argument is not easily understood when con-
. ~idered in relation to the e·ssential and outstanding-
reasons for the adoption of compensation acts. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Such arg'Ulllent is more imaginary than real and 
only tends to reopen personal viewpoints expressed 
in the past by corporate interests that lawyers 
frequently pressed 'unworthy causes arising out of 
personal injuries and like chargJes by injured ent-
ployees and their counsel, that the corporate inter-
ests and their attorneys frequently withheld facts 
and exercised economic preBsure upon employees to 
avoid legitimate re0overies. It has been quite some 
time since counsel has seen this type of argument 
stressed and certainly it is an unusual argument in 
view of present day social and economic readjust-
ments. It may, of course, be admitted that one of 
the reasons for the adoption of compensation acts 
was to permit employees or dependents to recover 
a non1inal amount of money without protracted 
litig-ation but the securing of such compensation 
was predicated entirely upon the theory that such 
henefits should be so se0ured to employees injured 
in the operation of that industry and not arising 
ont of the wrongful or negligent acts of third 
pPrsons. 
Practically all con1pensation acts have now come 
to recognize that the employees or their depend-
ents, or the insurance carrier paying con1pensation 
henefits Rhould be permitted to recover from third 
rwrsons for injury or death arising in the course 
of employment proximately caused by such wrong-
ful acts or negligence. We have not before seen an 
nrg-ument against such recovery predicated upon 
the theory or suggestion that it would tend to create 
opportunities for fraud or improper legal conduct. 
It is most difficult to square this kind of argument 
when viewed in the lig-ht of the facts in this case. 
Here the deceased emplo~ee came to his dea.th as 
the result of the grossest kind of ne~ligence on the 
part of the defendant. Now hecause the depend-
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ents and insurance carrier seek to recover for this 
wrongful and negligent conduct, it is suggested 
that such recovery should be denied beeause it 
would give rise to fraud or legalized chicanery. As 
we see it the statute was intended to reach situa-
tions of this very kind. When the wrong-doing de-
fendant is requested to respond for the damage 
caused and occasioned hy its. wrong or its neg1li-
gence it immediately attempts to shield itself by 
urging the very technical defense in view of our 
statute, of non-assignability. 
\Ve again urge upon the Court a consideration of the 
1nterest which by the statute is. gliven to the injured 
employee or his dependents. Under the Utah stat-
ute any person who has a real interest in a contro-
versy is a proper party p~aintiff. \V e think it must 
be conceded that there was 'a clear intendment by 
the express language of the statute to give added 
benefits to the injured employee or to his depend-
ents. If that is true then they become real parties 
in interest. In 
Section 1602, C. J., Title \Vorkman's Com-
-pensation Acts, 
it is said that where under the Act the employee 
or dependents of the deeeased employee have a 
beneficial interest in the amount recoverable from 
such person) if such amount is more than sufficient 
to inde1nnify the emplo~Ter or insurer, usually the 
right of the employer o'r insurer who is entitled to 
subrogation under the act is not exclusive and th£-
ernployee, or, in the case of the death of the em-
~lovee, the . dependents, or the p·ersonal· represen-
ttittl-Ve of the- employee, may sue as a real party in 
interest. ~r~t :•; ' ,;~~ . 
No opinion was expressed by any of the Justices 
aR to the effe-ct of the waiver which forms part of 
1 
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the assignment of the insurance carrier to the 
plaintiffs. \V e again call the Court's attention to 
the holding of some of the cases cited in 
Section 1603 U. J ., Title Workman's Com-
pensation Acts, 
to the effect that the benefit of or rights acquired 
under provisions of the general type here consider-
ed may be waived by the employer or insurer or 
lost by estoppel and if by an ag~reement between 
the employer and the employee the right 1 to bring 
an action against the tort-feaso•r is left with the 
employee the tort-feasor ma.y not complain. 
In this case no one complains about the right of 
the plaintiffs to maintain this action to recover 
additional benefits except the wrong-doer itself, 
the person responsible for the death. Further-
more, there is ample authority for the proposition 
tp.at the statute, which by clear intendment at-
tempts to confer these benefits on the injured em-
ployee or dependents, should be liberally con-
strued to effeet the beneficial purposes intended 
and to prevent a failure of remedy. Some of the 
cases hold that on failure of the employer or in-
surer to bring action then the right of ac.tion passes 
to the employee, and the employee, or in case of· his 
death, the personal representative, 1nay prosecute 
the action in his own name, the employer retaining 
only an interest in the proceeds to the extent of his 
compensation payments. The language of the 
compensation acts differ materially but they are 
all aimed at the same purpose, towit, to permit the 
recovery of additional benefits by the employee or 
his dependents against the person responsible for 
injury or death by wrongful act or negligence. 
We have not attempted to analyze all of thP- stat-
utory provisions, but have examined the' N ebra~l\:a 
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statute as it ex~sted at the time of the Nebraska de-
cision hereinafter referred to. The statute was as 
follorws: 
'' r11he employer shall be subrogated to the 
right of the employee or to the dependents 
against such third person, and the re-
covery by such employer shall not be lim-
ited to the amorunt ~payable as compensa-
tion to such employee or dependents, but 
such employer may recover any amount 
which such employee or his dependents 
·would have been entitled to recover. Any 
recovery by the employer against such 
third person in e·xcess of the compensation 
pa1 d by the employer after deducting the 
expenses of making such recovery, shall 
he paid forthwith to the employee or to the 
dependents and shall be treated as an ad-
vance payment by the employer, on account 
of any future installments of compelJ-
~Rtion. '' 
In the Nebraska case of 
Thomas v. Otis Elevator Company, 172 
N. W. 53, 
the Supreme Court of that Statf~ held that the stat-
ute djd not take away the right of the employee to 
re1cover damages against a third person when thA 
relation of master and servant does not exist; that 
the seetiorn was designed for the protection of an 
employer who had paid compensation, and that if 
the employer's rights were protected, it wa.s no 
concern of the _negligent third party. 
In the case of 
0 'Donnel1 v. ·Baker Ice Machinery Com-
pany, (Neb.), 205 N. W. 5fH. 
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against the third party rests with the employer 
only until such time as· the employee can allege and 
prove that his employer has negiected and refused 
to institute the action, and that the employer is 
subrogated to the position of the plaintiff (em-
ployee) and in case the employer, after having 
settled with the employee under the Workman'~ 
Compensation Act, refus·es to proceed and washes 
its hands of the whole procedure, then plaintiff 
~hould not be prevented from proceeding under the 
provisions of the Act as was done in that ca..~e. 
To the same effect i~ 
Murphy Conlpany v. Serck, 177 N. W. 747. 
In a Minnes·ota case, 
:l\1cGuigan v. Allen, 206 N. W. 714, 
the Court arrived at the following 
conclusion: 
( 1) The right of action under the death 
statute is not taken away but may be ex-
ercised by the personal representative for 
thP benefit of the dependents, notwith-
standing the fact that the employer can 
hr compel1ed to make or has made com-
pensation. 
( 2) That if such action is brougilit and 
judgment obtained and collected or a RettlP.-
mfmt is made, the net amount received is to 
l"P credited upon the or deducted from the 
fl()mpensation payable by the employer. 
(3) If the compensation is paid, the em-
ployer becomes subrogated to the rights 
of the employee or his dependents as 
rwainst the third party, and if the re-
covery exceeds the compensation paid, the 
rxcN~s belongs to the employee or his de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ll) 
pendents after deducting certain expenses 
1nentioned in the statute. 
In the c~se of 
City of Redwing v. Eichinger, 303 N. W. 
622, 
it is s~aid by the Court that a statutory subrogation 
has the same characteristics as if it were -a creature 
of equity. It is enforced only for the purpose of 
accomplishing the ends of justice. 
Respectfully submitted. 
A. H. HOUGAARD, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS 
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